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INTRODUCTION

Concerns about the interrogation process and the ability of

minors to navigate the criminal justice system often intersect. The
impact of the age of juveniles can be seen in a variety of judicial
decisions, most markedly those dealing with punishment. The
Supreme Court has made clear that juveniles are not to be treated as
adults during sentencing. For example, the Court does not allow
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killers to be executed if younger than eighteen-years-old,' it has
eliminated sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses
committed by young people, 2 and has prohibited mandatory life
sentences without parole for minors.3 But judicial concern for
juveniles goes well beyond sentencing. The interrogation process
raises especially grave fears. 4
Since the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Miranda
v. Arizona disallowing compelled inculpatory statements by criminal
suspects and defendants, there has been concern as to whether
juveniles fully understand and appreciate their rights as articulated
in Miranda and based in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.5 This Article examines the way a defendant's age is
factored into a court's review of how the defendant understood his or
her rights during the criminal justice process. This Article specifically
reviews this question as it concerns a juvenile defendant's waiver of
rights, behavior during interrogation, requests for counsel and other
entitlements, custodial status as mandated by Miranda, and his or
her general receipt of the Miranda warning. This Article also
examines the holding and application of another Supreme Court
decision, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,in which the Court articulated the
parameters surrounding when age must be considered in making
Mirandacustody determinations. 6 To fully appreciate the difficulties
posed by applying Mirandato juveniles, it is appropriate to first look
briefly at Miranda and its custody mandate.
I. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

The United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision fifty
years ago sought to give clarity to a murky area. Prior to Miranda,the
prevailing law on confessions looked almost entirely to the issue of

1.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

2.

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

3.

See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see also People v. Lopez, 2017

WL 2953682, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2017) ("There is little question that new and
evolving research on adolescent brain development has significantly altered our
jurisprudence on adolescent culpability in a variety of ways. . . .").
4. The judiciary's wariness of juvenile interrogation is discussed in the case
which is central to this article, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). As we
shall see infra, the Supreme Court in J.D.B., id., emphasized that the age of the minor
suspect is relevant when determining whether she was in custody for the purpose of
requiring Mirandawarnings during questioning.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
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voluntariness: did the police coerce an incriminating statement thus
violating due process? After a large number of decisions,7 the Court
ended up giving little guidance on the appropriate standards. Each
case seemed to be remarkably fact specific.8 Indeed, as one
commentator recently noted, the cases did not set out the standards
with any degree of precision:

.

Not surprisingly . . . the first thirty years of the Court's
experiment with regulating confession law demonstrated the
unworkability of a completely open-ended standard. The lower
courts were all over the map in their descriptions of what made
a confession involuntary and were consistent only in their
pervasive tendency to uphold whatever the police might do in
a given case. It was well understood that police were beating
suspects-particularly African American men in the Southand using extreme psychological and physical pressure to get
suspects to confess. But the voluntariness test was too vague
to force police to stop these abusive interrogation methods.
Potentially innocent people were being convicted ...
This level of confusion pushed the Court into rethinking its
approach on interrogation, resulting in a broadening of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. In Miranda v.

7. See generally Paul Marcus, It's Not Just About Miranda Determining the
Voluntariness of Confessions in CriminalProsecutions, 40 VAL. U.L. REV. 601 (2006).
8. The leading case is Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). There, the Court
found the incriminating statement to be involuntary because of more than a dozen
significant factors, including: Spano was foreign-born with no past history of law
violation, he had progressed only one-half year into high school, he had a history of
emotional instability, he did not make a narrative statement, he was asked leading
questions by an experienced prosecutor leading to a question and answer confession,
he was subjected to questioning by many officers, he was questioned for virtually eight
straight hours before he confessed, the questioning was not conducted during normal
business hours (it began in early evening and continued well into the night), the
questioners persisted even with repeated refusals by Spano to answer on the advice of
his attorney, and the officers ignored his requests to contact a local attorney.
Additionally, the officers used a childhood friend of Spano's in the interrogation, who
was at that time attending the police academy. The friend, Bruno, falsely told Spano
that Bruno's job was in jeopardy unless Spano confessed, and that the loss of his job
would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child. Id. at 32123. With so many factors considered, there was not a great deal of precedential value
created by that decision.
9. Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
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Arizonao the majority-over the sharp dissents of several Justicesconcluded that the privilege applied to the interrogation process and
that a specific set of warnings would be required in most settings."
The Chief Justice made clear that the majority no longer wished to
view the issues here principally on a case-by-case basis:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 12
This certainly seems straightforward enough. If an individual is
in custody and is being questioned, any resulting incriminating
statements cannot be used at trial unless those warnings were
given. However, it is not so straightforward, as the Court never
conclusively defined "interrogation." Consider statements by an
officer to a suspect in the squad car where the statements were not
questions, but were appeals to the individual's conscience "that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for
the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve

10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. Id. at 444.
12. Id. There has been much fine scholarship over the past half century about
the decision and its implications. For a look at some of the more recent work, see
Donald Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth Should Go Fourth, 97
B.U. L. Rev. 893 (2017); Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2016);
Tracey Macin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with
Some Shots Directedat Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387 (2015); Primus, supra
note 9. The nation's premier expert on Mirandais Michigan Professor Yale Kamisar.
One of his most recent articles in the area is The Rise, Decline and Fall(?) of Miranda,
87 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012).
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and murdered." 13 The Court in Brewer v. Williams found that these
statements qualified as interrogation. 14 But, the Court shifted in
Rhode Island v. Innis15 and found that a similar statement made in a
squad car would not be interrogation because the comment was
directed by one officer to another in the car, even though it was heard
by the accused.16
The Court in Mirandarepeatedly explained acceptable language
that warnings should include. Some law enforcement officers have,
however, moved beyond the language in the decision and have used
somewhat less precise language with suspects. Does the Court reject
warnings that do not make it clear to the suspects that they could
have an attorney before, during, and after the questioning? The Court
concluded such warnings are close enough if they "touch[| all of the
bases required by Miranda."7 These are hardly the only issues
surrounding the Miranda requirements. Other issues include
whether an improper statement could be used at trial to impeach,' 8
whether tangible evidence found as a result of the improper statement
could be offered at trial,' 9 defining the role of the traditional fruit-ofthe-poisonous tree doctrine in the Fifth Amendment context, 20 and the
possibility of exceptions in cases of true emergency. 2 1
These and other Miranda-related issues are of particular
importance when the suspect is a juvenile. Serious questions are then
raised on whether the suspect adequately understands and waives his

13. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 393 (1977).
14. Id. at 399-400. Although the case was decided under the Sixth Amendment
not the Fifth Amendment (because the accused had already been charged and had
retained counsel), the standard for interrogation in both instances is the same in
practice.
15. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
16. Id. at 305.
17. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); see also Florida v. Powell, 559
U.S. 50, 53 (2010); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 355 (1981).
18. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (such a statement can be used to
impeach).
19. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (such evidence can be offered at
trial).
20. Historically, most of the case law on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
came from Fourth Amendment search rulings, as in Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963). In the Fifth Amendment area, however, the Court is much more
deferential to the government as to the application of the rules. See, e.g., Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1985) (allowing a second confession with warnings just
after a first-inadmissible-confession was given without warnings).
21. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (exceptions are granted in
cases of true emergency).
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Miranda rights, whether the content of the interrogation is unduly
coercive in part because of the suspect's age, and whether a juvenile
is adequately equipped to request an attorney or the ceasing of the
interrogation.
A. Waiver
Courts tend to be anxious when it comes to a young person's
understanding of Mirandawarnings. 22 There is considerable case law
exploring whether a minor sufficiently understands warnings to be
able to waive a right to remain silent or speak with counsel. In its
principal ruling on the issue, the Supreme Court found that a
juvenile's request to speak with his probation officer was not a request
to remain silent or to have the assistance of an attorney. 23 The Court
reaffirmed that the totality of the circumstances is relevant when
determining whether an incriminating statement was voluntary and
whether a waiver of rights was valid, 24 finding that
[t]his totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to
determine whether there has been a waiver even where
interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no
persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where
the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as
opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality
approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes
evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the

22. Some of the best work on the topic is by University of Minnesota Law
Professor Barry Feld. In two particular articles, he explores social science research
and case law on the ways minors construe warnings given to them by law enforcement
officers. See Barry Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops
Questions Kids, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 395 (2013); Barry Feld, Juveniles'
Competence to Exercise MirandaRights: An EmpiricalStudy of Policy and Practice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006); see also Jessica Powell, Do You Understand Your Rights as I
Have Read Them to You? Understandingthe Warnings Fifty Years Post Miranda, 43
N. KY. L. REv. 435, 439 (2016) ("Considering that between 10-12% of the prison
population has an 8th grade education or less and that about 40% did not complete
high school or obtain a GED, the vocabulary level of Mirandawarnings may be too
high for a significant number of suspects to understand."). See generally Kristin North,
Recess is Over: GrantingMiranda Rights to Students InterrogatedInside School Walls,
62 Emory L.J. 441, 459-62 (2012). The problem, of course, goes beyond juvenile
suspects.
23. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719-23 (1979).
24. Id. at 724-25.
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capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving
25
those rights.
Many court decisions consider the waiver issue as it relates to
minors. Courts uniformly stress the youth of the offender. The New
York Appellate Division emphasized this factor, stating that the
County Court properly found that defendant's confession to
the police was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The
question of whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue
to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances,
with deference accorded to the suppression court's factual
findings and credibility determinations. Some of the factors to
be considered in this assessment include "the defendant's age,
experience, education, background, intelligence and capacity
to understand the warnings, constitutional rights and
26
consequences of a waiver."
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated "[W]e are very
much aware that respondent is of tender years. For that reason'[i]t is
well settled' that 'the validity of a juvenile's waiver of his or her rights
should be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding that waiver."' 27 The Oregon Court of Appeals similarly
found that
youth was of average intelligence and the testing administered
by the psychologist did not indicate that youth had any
learning disabilities. Youth's education level and mental age
were both commensurate with his chronological age. In fact,
taken together, youth's age, intelligence, education, and
demonstrated cognitive ability to track with and respond to
the detective's questions constitute evidence that he had the
competency to understand the warnings and the consequences
28
of waiving them.

25. Id. at 725 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)). But see Jean
Pierce, Comment, Juvenile Miranda Waivers: A Reasonable Alternative to the Totality
of the CircumstancesApproach, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 195 (2017) (sharply criticizing this
approach).
26. People v. Perkins, 124 A.D.3d 1062, 1063 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (internal
citations omitted) (sixteen-year-old offender).
27. In re Francis, 30 A.3d 630, 635 (R.I. 2011) (citing In re Joseph B., 822 A.2d
172, 174 (R.I. 2003)) (twelve-year-old); see also State v. Diaz, 847 N.W.2d 144, 165
(S.D. 2014) (sixteen-year-old); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th
Cir. 2010) (fourteen and fifteen-year-olds).
28. In re LAW., 226 P.3d 60, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (twelve-year-old); see also
In Re S.W., 124 A.3d 89, 98 (D.C. 2015) (citations omitted) ("The 'admissions and
confessions of juveniles require special caution.' Applying the totality of the
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Courts have evaluated the age factor to find both non-understanding
and understanding of a waiver. The California Court of Appeals
recognized that
defendant was 17 and one-half years old, and the recording
reveals not a frightened, immature child but a calm, composed
young man. [D]efendant was born in California and, while
defendant's exact level of education is unclear, he understood
what was said to him and asked of him, and he responded
appropriately. 29
Many states use this analytical framework, focusing on the age of the
offender. 30
Questions about the ability of young people to understand the
waiver process has led some states to enact specific statutes offering
added protection to youthful suspects. They include laws mandating
that waivers be recorded, 31 requiring a responsible adult to be present
during the waiver process, 3 2 or establishing a rebuttable presumption
that confessions by some minors are not admissible unless the state
shows by clear and convincing evidence that-as expressed in her own

circumstances inquiry to the juvenile context, we consider 'the juvenile's age,
experience, education, background and intelligence, the circumstances under which
the statement was given, and whether the juvenile has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences
of waiving those rights'" discussing a fifteen-year-old).
29. People v. Bonilla, 2016 WL 4733257, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2016); see
also Hall v. Thomas, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 2009) ("Hall was fifteen,
not a young child, and he could read, and could function independently-walking to
and from school, taking care of his sister, taking care of his needs at home."); Carter
v. Thompson, 690 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2012) (sixteen-year-old).
30. "In the context of Mirandarights, 'the question of waiver must be determined
on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' That a suspect is a juvenile is, of
course, of significance in the analysis of the waiver issue. The inquiry into the totality

of circumstances extends to the 'evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and [consideration of] whether [the juvenile] has the
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.'" M.A.B. v. State, 957 So. 2d 1219,
1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted) (fifteen-year-old). See generally
People v. Jones, 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 186-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (sixteen-year-old);
In re Anna G., 2016 WL7438702 *3-4 (Cal. App. 2016) (fifteen-year-old); Carter v.
Thompson, 690 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2012) (sixteen-year-old); United States v.
Guzman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 312, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (seventeen-year-old).
31. See WIS. STAT. §938.195 (2013).
32. See 705 IELCS 405/5-170(a) (2016).
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words-the suspect understood the warnings. 33 One broad model is
the North Carolina statute, which expanded protection in several
ways:
§7B-2 101. Interrogation procedures.
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to
questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and
may be used against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian,
or custodian present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney
and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile
is not represented and wants representation.
(b) When the juvenile is less than 16 years of age, no incustody admission or confession resulting from interrogation
may be admitted into evidence unless the confession or
admission was made in the presence of the juvenile's parent,
guardian, custodian, or attorney. If an attorney is not present,
the parent, guardian, or custodian as well as the juvenile must
be advised of the juvenile's rights as set out in subsection (a)
of this section; however, a parent, guardian, or custodian may
not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.
(c) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of
questioning pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not
wish to be questioned further, the officer shall cease
questioning.
(d) Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting
from custodial interrogation, the court shall find that the
juvenile knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived the
juvenile's rights. 34

33. New Mexico law, as explained in State v. Deangelo M., 360 P.3d 1151, 1157
(N.M. 2015).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7B-2101 (2015) (discussed in State v. Saldierna, 794 S.E.2d
474, 477-78 (N.C. 2016)). Some legislators have proposed rewording warnings so that
juveniles are more likely to understand the process and the protections offered. See
Lorelei Laird, Miranda For Youngsters: Police Routinely Read Juveniles Their Rights,

But
Do Kids Really
Understand Them?,
ABA
J.
June
2016,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/police-routinely-readjuveniles-their_
mirandarights-but-dokidsreallyund. A proposal from the Reporters to the
American Law Institute on Principlesof the Law Policing is quite specific as to the
needs of minors being questioned:
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B. Interrogation
Another major hesitation concerning juveniles in the criminal
justice system involves the amount of pressure exerted by a police
officer before a statement is deemed involuntary, and thus
inadmissible, under the Due Process Clause. This is wholly apart from
Miranda considerations, and is especially distinct when the person
being questioned is not an adult. The case law in this area is
voluminous, with two leading decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Haley v. Ohio,35 and Gallegos v. Colorado.3 6 In Haley,37
fifteen-year-old Haley was arrested near midnight on a charge of
murder relating to an armed robbery which had been committed five
days earlier. His interrogation ended around 5 a.m. with a signed
confession. 38 At a time when juries were allowed to consider whether
confessions were involuntary and thus inadmissible,3 9 the jurors

§ 11.06. Questioning of Members of Vulnerable Populations
Officers should assess carefully a person's background, age, education,
mental impairment, and physical condition in order to determine
vulnerability to coercion and suggestion. Officers should minimize the need
to question members of vulnerable populations, such as juveniles, people
with mental illness, and people with intellectual disability, and they should
do so with minimal coercion and the utmost care. In addition:
(a) Hearing-impaired individuals or non-English-speaking individuals
should be provided with necessary assistance or translators prior to the
reading of rights or any questioning.
(b) A juvenile age 14 or younger can give a valid waiver of the right to counsel
and the right to remain silent only after meaningful consultation with and in
the presence of counsel.
Preliminary Draft No. 3, October 4, 2017 at 92. This requirement of a lawyer goes well
beyond what the vast majority of states mandate.
35. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
36. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
37. 332 U.S. at 597.
38. Id. at 598.
39. The Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), changed the
jury's involvement in this process. Prior to the holding in Jackson, in many states a
trial court would "receive the confession and leave to the jury, under proper
instructions, the ultimate determination of its voluntary character and also its
truthfulness," Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953), even if the incriminating
statement was arguably coerced. The Court remarked that this procedure made it
"impossible to discover whether the jury found the confession voluntary and relied
upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it", Jackson, 378 U.S. at 379, and, as a
result, eliminated the jurors from the due process evaluation of coercion.
The New York jury is at once given both the evidence going to voluntariness
and all of the corroborating evidence showing that the confession is true and
that the defendant committed the crime. The jury may therefore believe the
confession and believe that the defendant has committed the very act with
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determined that the statement was voluntary and then found Haley
guilty as charged.40 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the state courts and determined that the methods used to obtain
the conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 1 The Court particularly focused on the youth of the
offender:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved. ... Age 15 is a tender and difficult
age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more
exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man
cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens.... A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead
of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the
inquisition. 42
Similarly, in Gallegos, the Court once again emphasized the
importance of the fourteen-year-old defendant's youth in evaluating
the methods used to exact a confession:
The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his right to
counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his
parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated,
is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him
when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say,
we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to
know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.4
It is important to note that review of the suspect's individual
characteristics has never been limited only to juveniles who confessed.
Unlike the chiefly objective focus on custody under Miranda, the
examination of coercion in the interrogation process has always been
heavily subjective for all those being questioned. The Supreme Court

which he is charged, a circumstance which may seriously distort judgment of
the credibility of the accused and assessment of the testimony concerning the
critical facts surrounding his confession.
Id. at 381. After Jackson, the voluntariness determination is entirely up to the court,
though the jury may still be asked to consider "that the manner in which the confession
was obtained casts doubt on its credibility." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689
(1986).
40. 332 U.S. at 599.
41. Id. at 599-601.
42. 332 U.S. at 599; see also In re Matter of S.R., 2017 WL 1300092 (Kan. Ct.
App. April 7, 2017); State v. Saldierna, 2017 WL 3027285 (N.C. Ct. App. July 18, 2017).
43. 370 U.S. at 54.
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in Yarborough v. Alvarado,44 discussed infra, would not look at the
age of the suspect when determining whether custody under Miranda
was present. The Court was careful, however, to distinguish the
analysis required by the due process review of interrogation. 45 " Tihe
voluntariness of a statement is often said to depend on whether 'the
defendant's will was overborne,' a question that logically can depend
on 'the characteristics of the accused'. 46 The characteristics of the
accused can include the suspect's age, education, and intelligence,
as well as a suspect's prior experience with law enforcement."4 7 Of
course, the Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina8moved to the more
subjective analysis of juveniles and the custody issue, as we shall see.
One can quickly find many important decisions which heavily
weigh the age and experience of the suspect in determining if a
confession by a minor was given voluntarily. Some recent cases show
just how difficult the interrogation process for juveniles can be. The
defendant in one prosecution was a fifteen-year-old who was with the
police for nearly eleven hours after his arrest, being questioned for
five-and-a-half hours. 49 The detectives used "tactics such as
minimizing, suggesting that [the] death may have been an accident,
and telling Moore that other witnesses were saying he shot [the
victim], to elicit a confession from him."50 Still, the majority was not

troubled, noting that while such "tactics may have influenced Moore,
they are tactics that courts commonly accept."5 1 The court explained
its view that the confession was freely given further, stating:
The age of the suspect may affect how we view police tactics;
"the younger the child the more carefully we will scrutinize
police questioning tactics to determine if excessive coercion or
intimidation or simple immaturity that would not affect an
adult has tainted the juvenile's confession." When a suspect is
a juvenile, "special caution" must be taken with the methods
of interrogation used when "a parent, lawyer, or other friendly
adult" is not present.
Although Moore was only 15-years-old at the time of his
questioning, he had more experience with police and law
enforcement than most people his age. Moore demonstrated
that he was able not only to develop a story about his
noninvolvement in the shooting but also to adapt the details of
44. 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (a habeas corpus challenge under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act).

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 668.

47.

Id. at 667-68.

48.
49.

See 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
State v. Moore, 864 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Wis. 2015).

50.
51.

Id. at 839.
Id.
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that story to information- either true or untrue-possessed
by the police. 52
Compare and contrast this decision with the opinions written in a case
involving the interrogation of a sixteen-year-old, made famous by the
Netflix series Making a Murderer.5 3 The trial court looked at a
number of relevant factors 54 in deciding the case, for "the
voluntariness of juvenile confessions must be evaluated with 'special
care."' 55 Ultimately that court found that the confession was coerced.
"For starters, Dassey was a juvenile-only 16 years old-at the time
of his confession."56 The trial judge elaborated:
Dassey was 16 years old and, aside from this investigation,
had never had any contacts with law enforcement... . His IQ
was assessed as being in the low average to borderline range.
He was a "slow learner" with "really, really bad" grades.
Specifically, he had difficulty understanding some aspects of
language and expressing himself verbally. He also had
difficulties in the "social aspects of communication" such as
"understanding and using nonverbal cues, facial expressions,
eye contact, body language, tone of voice." . . . [HIe received
special education services at school.
The March 1, 2006, interview was the fourth time the police
had questioned Dassey in 48 hours... . No adult was present
on Dassey's behalf.
. .. Fassbender stated [to Dassey], "I want to assure you that
Mark and I both are in your corner[.] We're on your side."
. . . Over the next approximately three hours (with a roughly
half-hour break), generally responding to the investigator's
questions with answers of just a few hushed words, a story
evolved whereby in its final iteration Dassey implicated
himself in the rape, murder, and mutilation of [the victim].5 7

52. Id. at 838. Two justices dissented, however. See id. at 849-52 (emphasizing
the defendant's age, level of education, diminished intellectual function, and mental
health issues; the duration of custody and interrogation; and the absence of a friendly
adult to confer with).
53. See Dassey v. Dittman, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963 (E.D.Wis. 2016), aff'd, 860 F.3d
933 (7th Cir. 2017)), vacated & reh'g granted, Dassey v. Dittmann, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14374 (7th Cir. 2017) (Dassey 1).
54. In Dassey I, the court analyzed the interrogation's length, location, and
continuity, and the defendant's maturity, education, physical condition, and mental
health. Id. at 993 (citing Supreme Court precedent).
55. Id.

56.

Id. at 999.

57. Id. at 969-70 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). A panel of the
7th Circuit affirmed the trial court, focusing again on the youth of the defendant and
the interrogation techniques used by the police: "Nowhere is the risk of involuntary
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The Seventh Circuit en banc, over a vigorous dissent, took a very
different view and allowed the statement:
[Many] factors support the finding that Dassey's confession
was indeed voluntary. Start with the circumstances of the
interrogation. As stipulated by both sides, Dassey was not in
custody when he admitted participating in the crimes of
October 31st. He went with the officers voluntarily and with
his mother's knowledge and consent. He was given Miranda
warnings and understood them sufficiently. The interrogation
was conducted during school hours and in a comfortable
setting. Dassey showed no signs of physical distress. He had
access to food, drinks, and restroom breaks. The interrogation
was not particularly lengthy, especially with the breaks that
were taken every hour.
Dassey was not subject to physical coercion or any sort of
threats at all. Given the history of coercive interrogation
techniques from which modern constitutional standards for
confessions emerged, this is important. The investigators
stayed calm and never even raised their voices. As the
Wisconsin courts found, there is no sign that Dassey was
intimidated. Turning to the techniques used in the
interrogation, the investigators told Dassey many times that
they already knew what had happened when in fact they did
not. Such deception is a common interview technique.... Also,
most of the incriminating details in Dassey's confession were
and false confessions higher than with youth and the mentally or intellectually

disabled. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has cautioned courts to exercise
'special caution' when assessing the voluntariness of juvenile confessions." Dassey v.
Dittmarm, 860 F.3d 933, 952 (7th Cir. 2017)), rev'd en banc, Dassey v. Dittmann, 877
F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (Dassey II); see also In re KT., 2017 WL 767002 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 28, 2017) (where the court emphasized that the suspect was only fourteen-yearsold and could well have been strongly influenced by investigators); People v. Jones,
213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 188-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (where the detective made several
deceptive statements to the sixteen-year-old suspect about the nature of the evidence
that the police had against both the suspect and his father, but conviction was affirmed
with the court stressing that the detective had not threatened either the son or the
father). In KT., the court observed that:
[The investigator's] request that the minor "just sign right there" and
continued statements that the shoplifting incident was "[niot a big deal" and
"not the end of the world" make the voluntariness of the minor's confession
highly suspect. The minor could have believed, based on [the investigator's]
statements that he had shoplifted and it was not a big deal, that she would
not be in trouble if she said she had stolen items from the store.
KT., 2017 WL 767002, at *3 (second alteration in original).
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not suggested by the questioners. He volunteered them in
response to open-ended questions. 58
The dissenting appeals judges sharply disagreed:
Psychological coercion, questions to which the police furnished
the answers, and ghoulish games of "20 Questions," in which
Brendan Dassey guessed over and over again before he landed
on the "correct" story (i.e., the one the police wanted), led to
the "confession" that furnished the only serious evidence
supporting his murder conviction in the Wisconsin courts.
Turning a blind eye to these glaring faults, the en
banc majority has decided to deny Dassey's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. . . . As the district court and the panel
majority recognized, we have before us . . . an extreme
malfunction. Dassey at the relevant time was 16 years old and
had an IQ in the low 80s. His confession was coerced, and thus
it should not have been admitted into evidence. And even if we
were to overlook the coercion, the confession is so riddled with
input from the police that its use violates due process. Dassey
will spend the rest of his life in prison because of the injustice
this court has decided to leave unredressed.5 9
Of course, if the child being questioned is very young, the review
sharpens considerably. See, for instance, the decision of one Illinois
court, in reviewing the actions of the law enforcement officers in
0
eliciting a confession from a nine-year-old child. 6
[We] recognize that "the receiving of an incriminating
statement by a juvenile is a sensitive concern." Thus, the
"greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or
suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." In light of
these concerns, we view respondent's age as a key factor in the
voluntariness analysis. 6 1
Furthermore, the court explained
statement was coerced, stating:

its finding that the

child's

The use of deception or subterfuge does not alone invalidate a
confession as a matter of law, but it is a factor to consider in
examining the totality of the circumstances. . . . From the

58. Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 312-13 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted).
59. Id. at 319 (Wood, C.J., Rovner and Williams, JJ., dissenting).

60.

In re D.L.H., Jr., 32 N.E.3d 1075 (Ill. 2015).

61.

Id. at 1090.
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outset of the second interview, [Detective] Adams seized on
respondent's fear that his [family members] would go to jail,
or that he, himself, would be taken away. Adams promised
respondent that no matter what he said, no one was going to
jail, no one would be in trouble, he would not be taken from his
father and, at the end of the day, he could go to his
grandmother's house and "hang out" with his dad. Adams
continually reinforced the notion that no consequences would
attach to an admission by respondent that he hit T.W. Adams
also rejected respondent's repeated denials of wrongdoing,
making plain that anything less than an admission was
unacceptable. Adams further downplayed the significance of
an admission, unceasingly telling respondent that whatever
happened was an accident or a mistake, and everybody makes
mistakes, even the detective. Adams was also explicit about
the kind of admission that would suffice-an admission that
respondent hit T.W. once. Respondent eventually admitted to
just that: hitting the infant once. Though an adult might very
well have been left "cold and unimpressed" with Adams's mode
of questioning respondent was just a boy of nine, functioning
at the level of a seven or eight-year-old, and thus far more
vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion of this type.62
The difference in the tone of the decisions, if not the holdings, is
impossible to reconcile. 63
62. Id. at 1095-96. In People v. Jones, 213 CaL Rptr. 3d 167, 188 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017), the court allowed the sixteen-year-old's incriminating statement:
Jones asserts that the detectives also used other deceptive tactics, including
threats against his father, to coerce Jones into confessing to his involvement
in the shootings. Jones argues that the various ploys and threats used by the
detectives were sufficient to overcome his will and undermine the
voluntariness of his confession. However, "the use of deceptive comments
does not necessarily render a statement involuntary. Deception does not
undermine the voluntariness of a defendant's statements to the authorities
unless the deception is 'of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue
statement.' 'The courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which,
under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a
statement that is both involuntary and unreliable.'"
Id. at 188 (citations omitted). But see In re Matter of S.R., 2017 WL 1300092, at *4
(Kan. App. 2017) (thirteen-year-old suspect's statement coerced).
63. In re S.W., 124 A.3d 89 (D.C. 2015), involved another fifteen-year-old suspect.
He was handcuffed to the floor during the interrogation; the detective used all sorts of
trickery and made veiled threats to induce the defendant to talk. Id. at 93-94. The
court rejected the incriminating statement and emphasized the youth of the subject,
stating that:
Bearing these principles in mind, we are keenly aware of the "special caution"
required in our de novo review of the voluntariness of appellant's confession,
given his juvenile status, and we take great care to assess the impact of subtle
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C. Requests by the Suspect
One other significant issue that surfaces regularly in this area is
whether the minor genuinely intends to cut off questioning or request
an attorney. The Supreme Court in Davis v. United States,64 decided
that the right to a lawyer during interrogation can only be legally
asserted with an "unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel."65
The point was reiterated, with a request for silence, in Berghuis v.

interrogation tactics.... [W]e must determine whether, on the totality of the
circumstances, appellant's will was overborne by Detective Howland's
remarks and the circumstances of the interrogation. Specific to the
voluntariness component, we also consider a juvenile suspect's physical and
mental condition, the duration and intensity of the interrogation, the hour at
which it occurred, and any evidence of physical abuse, threats, punishment,
or trickery.
We emphasize the role of appellant's juvenile status. In any custodial
interrogation situation, "the seemingly benign transmittal of information to
an accused may resemble the kind of mental games that largely generated
the Miranda decision itself." This warning is all the more applicable in the
juvenile context, where courts must exercise "special caution" in conducting
a voluntariness analysis.
Id. at 101-04 (citations omitted). In the case of In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202
(Cal. Ct. App. 2015), the judges were deeply concerned over the interrogator's tactics
and the potential for abuse when used with juveniles. The court stated:
Thus, for example, the most recent edition of the Reid manual on
interrogations notes that although the use of deception, including the use of
"fictitious evidence which implicates the subject," has been upheld by the
courts "this technique should be avoided when interrogating a youthful
suspect with low social maturity. . ." because such suspects "may not have
the fortitude or confidence to challenge such evidence and depending on the
nature of the crime, may become confused as to their own possible
involvement if the police tell them evidence clearly indicates they committed
the crime. Factors such as the adolescent's level of social responsibility and
general maturity should be considered before fictitious evidence is
introduced." The developing consensus about the dangers of interrogation
has resulted from the growing number of studies showing that the risk
interrogation will produce a false confession is significantly greater for
juveniles than for adults; indeed, juveniles usually account for one-third of
proven false confession cases.
Id. at 218 (citations omitted). The court concluded that the statement of the minor was
not voluntary. Id. at 225; see also State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793 (N.J. 2012), where
the judges sharply disagreed on the voluntariness of a thirteen-year-old's statement
to investigators.
64. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
65. Id. at 461-62.
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Thompkins.6 6 Since Davis and Thompkins, a number of cases have
been litigated exploring the reach of the decisions. Many of them
involve minors. The rulings here are utterly inconsistent. Some
decisions seemingly do not weigh the age of the declarant even though
her attorney raised age in this context.6 7 Other opinions make

mention of the matter, but the age does not factor heavily in the
determination of custody. One court wrote,
While J.D.B.'s analysis generally supports the view that a
juvenile suspect's known or objectively apparent age is a factor
to consider in an invocation determination, knowledge of
defendant's age would not have altered a reasonable officer's
understanding of defendant's statements in the circumstances
here. As indicated, defendant, who was 15-years-old, appeared
confident and mature.6 8
Still others apply J.D.B. and ultimately conclude that the unequivocal
request rule is satisfied principally because the suspect is a minor,
such as the court in In re Art T.69 The court there looked at both J.D.B.
and the youth of the declarant (thirteen-years-old) in finding a clear
request for an attorney:
[Wie find that Art's age of 13 and middle school level of
education, combined with his repeated requests for his
mother, would have made his lack of maturity and
sophistication objectively apparent to a reasonable officer. In
this context, Art's statement after viewing the video of the
shooting, "Could I have an attorney? Because that's not me,"
was an unequivocal request for an attorney. 70
There is a tremendous volume of litigation surrounding these
issues, and the courts are hardly consistent in applying apparently
concrete constitutional mandates as to minors. In one area judicial
decisions have been especially uneven and at odds: the application of
the Miranda custody requirement in cases in which the suspect is a
young person.

66.

560 U.S. 370 (2010).

67.
68.

See Rogers v. Kerns, 485 Fed. App'x 24, 31 (6th Cir. 2012).
People v. Nelson, 266 P.3d 1008, 1022 n.7 (Cal. 2012); see also Saldierna, 794

S.E.2d at 478-79 (applying a state law giving special protection to minors). See text
accompanying notes 116-19, infra.
69. 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
70. Id. at 799; see also People v. Villasenor, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 817 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015).
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II. THE CUSTODY MANDATE
While the aforementioned are important issues, what this article
examines is another recurring question, one that especially involves
minors in the criminal justice system: custody. A determination of
custody is of particular importance because Miranda's mandate is
only triggered when a suspect undergoes "custodial interrogation." 7 1
Unfortunately, the Court in Miranda gave little guidance on what it
meant by "custody" when it stated that its ruling comes into play
"after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." 7 2
In determining if the freedom of action has been limited
significantly, it is not the defendant's state of mind or the officer's
opinion that matters. It is an objective standard. "In determining
whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate
inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."7 3
Further, "the initial determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned." 74
This objective standard is easy to state, but it is far more difficult
to apply in practice. Consider, for instance, three situations that have
vexed the courts, ultimately requiring the Supreme Court to resolve
conflicts among lower tribunals.
A. Interrogationsat the Suspect's Residence
The defendant in Orozco v. Texas7 5 was arrested in his bedroom
during the night and he was interrogated.7 6 No Miranda warnings
were given.7 7 The government contended that warnings were not
needed, "since petitioner was interrogated on his own bed, in familiar
surroundings." 78 The Court strongly disagreed, stating that

71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
72. Id.
73. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (quotations omitted).
74. Id. at 323.
75. 394 U.S. 323 (1969).
76. Id. at 325.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 326. The point was picked up in the dissenting opinion of Justice White,
joined by Justice Stewart.
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"[a]ccording to the officer's testimony, petitioner was under arrest and
not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early
hours of the morning. The Mirandaopinion declared that the
warnings were required when the person being interrogated was 'in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."'7 9
Of course, just as Orozco does not mean that a person is never in
custody if interrogated in her own home, it also does not mean that a
person is always in custody if interrogated in her own home. The
litigation continues apace involving the thorny question of when is
that person in custody if interrogated at home but not under formal
arrest. These factors have turned out to be important in answering
that question: where the defendant is told she is not under arrest,8 o
where the defendant is told she may not leave until the officers are
finished, 8 ' where the defendant is handcuffed during the
questioning, 8 2 where the defendant is told she may use her cell
phone,8 3 where questioning goes on for a lengthy period of time 84 or is
for but a limited time, 85 where friends or family are present during
the interrogation,8 6 and where the defendant was being questioned to
obtain information, not because he was the key suspect.87

[The decision] ignores the purpose of Mirandato guard against what was
thought to be the corrosive influence of practices which station house
interrogation makes feasible. The Court wholly ignores the question whether
similar hazards exist or even are possible when police arrest and interrogate
on the spot, whether it be on the street corner or in the home, as in this case.
No predicate is laid for believing that practices outside the station house are
normally prolonged, carried out in isolation, or often productive of the
physical or psychological coercion made so much of in Miranda. It is difficult
to imagine the police duplicating in a person's home or on the street those
conditions and practices which the Court found prevalent in the station house
and which were thought so threatening to the right to silence.
Id. at 329-30 (White & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).

79.

Id. at 327.

80. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Guerrero, 145 F. Supp. 3d 753, 762 (N.D.
Ill. 2015); United States v. Williams, 760 F.3d 811, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2014); People v.
Castillo, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
81. State v. McKenna, 103 A.3d 756, 765 (N.H. 2014).
82. United States v. Borostowski, 775 F.3d 851, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2014).
83. Spencer v. United States, 132 A.3d 1163, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
84. People v. Jones, 2006 WL 1980365 *10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
85. State v. Beausoleil, 2015 WL 11181927, at *3 (N.H. 2015); State v. Kittredge,

97 A.3d 106, 111 (Me. 2014).
86.
87.

United States v. Krstic, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145-47 (D. Or. 2010).
State v. Kilgore, 882 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).
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B. Interrogationsat a Police Station
Consider next an interrogation that takes place at a police
station. A police station interrogation would be, for many people,
frightening and potentially traumatizing. Reasonable persons might
well believe that being interrogated in a police station would establish
custody and invoke the requirements of Miranda. Not so, wrote the
Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mathiason.8 The question, according to
the majority, was not the location of the process. 8 9 Rather, the
question turned on whether a reasonable person would have felt free
to leave the station.9 0 Because the process in Mathiason was
seemingly non-coercive, there was no custody.9 ' The per curium
opinion was short and directly to the point:
Where is no indication that the questioning took place in a
context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted
in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where
he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At
the close of a %2-hourinterview respondent did in fact leave the
police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts
that Mathiason was not in custody "or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in
which Mirandaapplies simply because a reviewing court
concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place
in a "coercive environment."
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that
the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which
may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.
But
police
officers
are
not
required
to
administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed
simply because the questioning takes place in the station
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the
police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where

88.

429 U.S. 492 (1977).

89.
90.
91.

Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
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there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him "in custody." It was that sort of coercive
environment to which Miranda, by its terms was made
applicable, and to which it is limited. 92
C. Interrogationsin Prison
Being questioned in jail or in prison is arguably more coercive and
frightening than even the police station. The early rulings of the
Supreme Court seemed to bear this out in finding custody for the
prisoner or inmate being interrogated. The defendant in Mathis v.
United StateS93 was in prison serving a state sentence. 94 He was
questioned there by a federal agent, and his incriminating statements
earned him a conviction in federal court. 95 No warnings were given
during the questioning.9 6 The government argued that the defendant
was not in custody during the interrogation because Miranda should
be "applicable only to questioning one who is 'in custody' in connection
with the very case under investigation." 97 In succinct fashion, the
majority rejected this view, noting that it "goes against the whole
purpose of the Mirandadecision which was designed to give
meaningful

protection

to

Fifth

Amendment

rights."9 8

Mathis

92. Id. Dissenting Justice Marshall strongly disagreed. For him, the application
of Mirandawas needed in this intense atmosphere:
Miranda requires warnings to "combat" a situation in which there are
"inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely." It is of course true, as the Court notes, that "[amny interview of one
suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it." But it
does not follow that, because police "are not required to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question," that they need not
administer warnings to anyone unless the factual setting of
the Mirandacases is replicated. Rather, faithfulness to Mirandarequires us
to distinguish situations that resemble the "coercive aspects" of custodial
interrogation from those that more nearly resemble "[g]eneral on-the-scene
questioning . .. or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process" which Miranda states usually can take place without warnings.
Id. at 497-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented, though on
other grounds. Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Id. Dissenting Justices White, Harlan and Stewart disagreed, emphasizing
the familiarity of the surroundings. "But Miranda rested not on the mere fact of
physical restriction, but on a conclusion that coercion-pressure to answer questions-
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seemingly settled the matter. If the suspect is incarcerated, custody
would be present regardless of the purpose of the interrogation.
That, at least, was the prevailing wisdom until 2012 with the
decision in Howes v. Fields.9 9 There, the Supreme Court reviewed a
court of appeals ruling that "a prisoner is in custody within the
meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, if the prisoner is taken aside and
questioned about events that occurred outside the prison walls."10 0
Not so, held the majority of Justices. The opinion by Justice Alto
recognized the earlier Mathis ruling but found that it is not the case
that "a prisoner is always in custody for purposes of Miranda
whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population
and questioned about conduct outside the prison."1 01 The process
involves a two-step analysis, the first being whether the defendant's
freedom of movement has been curtailed. 102 Here, the courts must
look to all the surrounding circumstances in making that
decision.1 03 The second is whether the interrogation took place in a
coercive atmosphere, and being in an incarcerated situation does not
necessarily make that atmosphere coercive so as to require Miranda
warnings.1 04 Several factors present in the instant case persuaded the
majority that this individual was not in custody for the purpose of
0 5
Miranda.1
"[Riespondent was told at the outset of the interrogation,
and was reminded again thereafter, that he could leave and go back
to his cell whenever he wanted. Moreover, respondent was not
physically restrained or threatened and was interviewed in a well-lit,

usually flows from a certain type of custody, police station interrogation of someone
charged with or suspected of a crime. Although petitioner was confined, he was at the
time of interrogation in familiar surroundings." Id. at 7. This was the point which
formed the basis for the later decision in Howes v. Fields, infra note 99.
99. 565 U.S. 499 (2012).
100. Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 508. The Court took the appeals judges to task. "The Sixth Circuit
misread Mathis, which simply held, as relevant here, that a prisoner who otherwise
meets the requirements for Mirandacustody is not taken outside the scope of Miranda
because he was incarcerated for an unconnected offense. It did not hold that
imprisonment alone constitutes Mirandacustody." Id. at 499.
102. Id.
103. Including "the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made
during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the
questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Id. at
509 (citations omitted).
104. Id.

105.

Id.
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average-sized conference room, where he was 'not uncomfortable.'
[Plus] [h]e was offered food and water. . . ."106
As illustrated by the examples above, a custody determinations
can be extremely nuanced, and anything but straightforward. The
matter is only complicated further when the suspect is a juvenile, with
arguably less understanding than an adult would have in a similar
situation.
III. CUSTODY AND MINORS, THE DECISION IN J.D.B. v. NORTH
CAROLINA

Less than ten years before the decision in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,0 7 , the Supreme Court determined whether a trial court
must consider the age of the minor in deciding if the custody
requirement was met under Miranda.108 The matter arose in
Yarborough v. Alvarado.0 9 Using rather broad language, the majority
found that weighing the age of the person questioned would be
inappropriate under the objective standard test set out in Miranda.110
"[C]ustody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in
the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances . . . the

custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear
guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual
characteristics-including his age-could be viewed as creating a
subjective inquiry.""'
For two reasons, though, in J.D.B. the Court was not bound by
this earlier decision. First, Alvarado did not come up on direct appeal

106. Id. at 516. Dissenting Justice Ginsburg-joined by Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor-analyzed the matter quite differently:
I would not train, as the Court does, on the question whether there can be
custody within custody. Instead, I would ask, as Miranda put it, whether
Fields was subjected to "incommunicado interrogation . . . in a policedominated atmosphere," whether he was placed, against his will, in an
inherently stressful situation, and whether his "freedom of action [was]
curtailed in any significant way."
Id. at 518 (Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). For her, Miranda was
violated here. "Today, for people already in prison, the Court finds it adequate for the
police to say: 'You are free to terminate this interrogation and return to your cell.' Such
a statement is no substitute for one ensuring that an individual is aware of his rights."
Id. at 519 (citations omitted).
107. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
108. Id.
109. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 662, 668.
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from a conviction.112 Instead, the Justices considered only the narrow
matter of whether the state court's decision on custody was an
"unreasonable application of clearly established law" under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).113
Second, the precise holding there was not established; the deciding
vote in the 5-4 Alvarado decision came from Justice O'Connor.114
While she did not see the need to take the age of this particular
offender into consideration-he was almost eighteen-years-old at the
time of the questioning-she wrote that "[t]here may be cases in which
a suspect's age will be relevant to the 'custody' inquiry." 115
When J.D.B. came before the Court, the principal question on
direct appeal was whether a trial court must consider the youth of a
juvenile offender in making the custody determination under
1 16
Miranda.
In a 5-4 decision, the answer was a resounding "Yes."11 7
To state the matter succinctly," 8 it is important to consider the youth

112.

Id. at 659.

113. Id. at 653-54.
114. Id. at 654.
115. Id. at 669. The four dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, forcefully
wrote of the relevance of the offender's age.
What about Alvarado's youth? The fact that Alvarado was 17 helps to show
that he was unlikely to have felt free to ignore his parents' request to come
to the station. [J]uveniles [are] assumed "to be subject to the control of their
parents." And a 17-year-old is more likely than, say, a 35-year-old, to take a
police officer's assertion of authority to keep parents outside the room as an
assertion of authority to keep their child inside as well.. . . Our cases do
instruct lower courts to apply a "reasonable person" standard. But the
"reasonable person" standard does not require a court to pretend that
Alvarado was a 35-year-old with aging parents whose middle-aged children
do what their parents ask only out of respect. Nor does it say that a court
should pretend that Alvarado was the statistically determined "average
person"-a working, married, 35-year-old.
Id. at 673-74. This analysis became the basis for the standard of the new majority in

J.D.B.
116. J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
117. Id. at 264.
118. Succinctly because neither the J.D.B. holding nor the wisdom of the majority
or dissent is the focus of this paper. Much excellent scholarly work has been done on
the basis for the Court's J.D.B. decision and the soundness of that ruling. The writings
on J.D.B. have been overwhelmingly supportive of the Court's ruling. See e.g., Martin
Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession
SuppressionLaw, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POl'Y 109 (2012); Sally T. Green, A Presumptive
In-Custody Analysis to Police-ConductedSchool Interrogations,40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145
(2013); Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court
Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposesof the
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of the alleged offender because, as the majority put it in its opening
paragraph,
[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to
submit to police questioning when an adult in the same
circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for
police officers or courts to blind themselves to that
commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly
informs the Mirandacustody analysis. 119
J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old middle school student who was
taken out of his classroom and questioned by several adults, including
a uniformed police officer. 120 He was not given Miranda warnings and
he made an incriminating statement while being questioned.121 The
state courts refused to look to his age in deciding if custody was
present. 122 The lower courts there relied on Alvarado and wrote that
they would not "extend the test for custody to include consideration of
the age . . . of an individual subjected to questioning by police." 123
Justice Sotomayor for the majority 24 took a very different view,

Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far
&

Behind? 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 501 (2012); Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider
Steven A. Drizin, Scrutinizing ConfessionsIn a New Era of Juvenile Jurisprudence, 50
CT. REV. (2014). For a contrary view, see Ronald J. Allen, Do (Should) Juveniles Have
More, Less, The Same, Or Different Rights Than Adults: The GravitationalPull Of
Miranda's Blackhole: The Curious Case Of J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 46 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 143 (2013).
119. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264-65.
120. Id. at 265.
121. Id. at 267.
122. Id. at 268.

123.

Id.

124. Justices Scalia and Thomas, along with the Chief Justice, joined Justice Alito
in dissent. For them, the majority had moved away from the key goal of Miranda:to
apply a neutral, objective test for the admissibility of incriminating statements under
the Fifth Amendment.
Today's decision shifts the Miranda custody determination from a one-sizefits-all reasonable-person test into an inquiry that must account for at least
one individualized characteristic-age-that is thought to correlate with
susceptibility to coercive pressures. Age, however, is in no way the only
personal characteristic that may correlate with pliability, and in future cases
the Court will be forced to choose between two unpalatable alternatives. It
may choose to limit today's decision by arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect's
age from other personal characteristics-such as intelligence, education,
occupation, or prior experience with law enforcement-that may also
correlate with susceptibility to coercive pressures. Or, if the Court is

2017]1

MIRANDA CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

277

emphasizing the difficult situation involving minors and their
susceptibility to influence by law enforcement personnel. 125 Of
particular concern was the growing evidence relating to false
confessions given by minors. 126
By its very nature, custodial police interrogation entails
"inherently compelling pressures." Even for an adult, the
physical and psychological isolation of custodial interrogation
can "undermine the individual's will to resist and . . . compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense
that it "can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to
confess to crimes they never committed." That risk is all the
more troubling-and recent studies suggest, all the more
acute-when the subject of custodial interrogation is a
juvenile. 127
Rejecting the dissenters' characterization of the majority holding
as an unworkable extension of Miranda,Justice Sotomayor wrote that
age was only one additional factor which police officers and judges
could readily evaluate. 128
Though the State and the dissent worry about gradations
among children of different ages, that concern cannot justify
ignoring a child's age altogether. Just as police officers are
competent to account for other objective circumstances that
are a matter of degree such as the length of questioning or the
number of officers present, so too are they competent to
evaluate the effect of relative age. Indeed, they are competent
to do so even though an interrogation room lacks the

unwilling to draw these arbitrary lines, it will be forced to effect a
fundamental transformation of the Miranda custody test-from a clear,
easily applied prophylactic rule into a highly fact-intensive standard
resembling the voluntariness test that the Miranda Court found to be
unsatisfactory.
Id. at 283.
125. Id. at 281.
126. Id. at 269.
127. Id. The most recent research consistently finds that adolescents are more
likely to confess falsely than adults. See e.g., Pamela Pimentel, et al., Taking the Blame
for Someone Else's Wrongdoing.- The Effects ofAge and Reciprocity, 39 Law and Human
Behavior 219 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1hb0000132.
128. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 279.
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"reflective atmosphere of a [jury] deliberation room." The same
is true of judges, including those whose childhoods have long
since passed. In short, officers and judges need no imaginative
powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in
cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural
anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old
and neither is an adult. 129
That key question as to the use of age in the custody determination
under Miranda has now been answered, and numerous state and
federal decisions have been issued on point.130 The key inquiry,
though, is how the courts have, in the several years since J.D.B.,
applied the mandate that they must weigh the age of the minor in
deciding if she was in custody while being interrogated. The long
answer is a bit complicated. The short answer, however, is clear: the
courts have not applied the mandate in any sort of consistent fashion.
IV. APPLYING THE J.D.B. CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

The impact of J.D.B. has not been overwhelming, nor has it been
severely limited. Its impact has not been overwhelming in part
because the majority of juvenile offenders (and presumably those
being subject to interrogation) are at least sixteen-years-old.1 3 1

129. Id. at 279-80.
130. Though not in the J.D.B. case itself. On remand to the North Carolina courts,
no official action was taken; J.D.B. was not recharged in the matter. There is no
official, available record reflecting this. The information comes from correspondence
with counsel, on file with the author.
131. This point was emphasized by Justice Alito in his J.D.B. dissent:
As an initial matter, the difficulties that the Court's standard introduces will
likely yield little added protection for most juvenile defendants. Most
juveniles who are subjected to police interrogation are teenagers nearing the
age of majority. These defendants' reactions to police pressure are unlikely
to be much different from the reaction of a typical 18-year-old in similar
circumstances. A one-size-fits-all Miranda custody rule thus provides a
roughly reasonable fit for these defendants.
Id. at 283. A dividing line as to responsible maturity levels has drawn criticism from
neuroscientists who research brain development in young people. As one prominent
scholar wrote, "Neuroscientists aren't too concerned with trying to pinpoint the age of
maturity-because we see plenty of problems with doing that-but policy has really
dragged us into the conversation, which is making the community question how we
can translate the research responsibly." The Challengeof DefiningMaturity When the
Brain
Never
Stops
Changing,
NEURON,
December
21,
2016,
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Empirical evidence shows that there is relatively little difference
between the sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds and the eighteen-yearolds in understanding-if not fully appreciating-rights in the
interrogation setting. 132 To be sure, the J.D.B. majority itself seemed
to concede the point: 'This is not to say that a child's age will be a

https://www.eurekalert.org/pub-releases/2016-12/cp-tcol21416.php. For a discussion
of the ongoing debate, see Carl Zimmer, You're an Adult. Your Brain, Not So Much,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/science/youre-anadult-your-brain-not-so-much.html
132. One commentator makes the point clearly. "Most youths sixteen years of age
or older exhibit cognitive abilities comparable to adults. . . ." Barry C. Feld,
Questioning Gender, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1059, 1075. That same commentator,
however, cautions care in equating the thought process of the teen to the adult. "While
most youths sixteen years of age or older exhibit cognitive abilities comparable with
adults, they do not develop mature judgment and adult-like competence to make
decisions until their twenties." Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 22, at 405. See
also Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2184-85 (2016).
Juveniles are developmentally at a greater disadvantage than their adult
counterparts in police-citizen encounters. Specifically, they lack mature
judgment and impulse control, which make them less likely to perceive risks
and thus be more reckless and greater risk-takers. . .. Although by age
sixteen or seventeen, teenagers have similar reasoning and processing
abilities as adults, adolescents of this age are "less capable than adults [] in
using these capacities in making real-world choices."
For a good discussion of this difference, see Nat'1 Inst. of Mental Health, The Teen
Construction, https://infocenter.nimh.nih.gov/pubstatic/
Brain: Still
Under
NIH%2011-4929/NIH%2011-4929.pdf. One commentator put the matter in stark
terms:
After advising suspects that they have a right to counsel and the right to
remain silent, police typically ask a suspect some version of the following
questions:
Q: Do you understand each of the rights as I've explained them to you?
Q: Do you wish to speak with me?
These deceptively simple questions require juveniles to do a cognitive task
that often exceeds their abilities. Overwhelming empirical evidence shows
that juveniles do not understand their constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, or the consequence of waiving their rights. This is not new
information. . . . All told, research paints a dubious picture of juvenile
suspects' capacity to understand and assert their rights during custodial
interrogation. The reality is likely even worse than the research shows.
Because of limits on experiments involving human subjects (researchers
cannot ethically replicate the capacity-reducing stress of an interrogation
room), the findings likely overstate youths' ability to understand and assert
their rights.
Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 902, 914-15, 918
(2017).
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determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case."1 33 Still, the
Court's mandate of age consideration as to custody has made a
genuine and substantial impact. Many juveniles each year are
charged with serious crimes, and many of these individuals are below
the age of sixteen, sometimes well below that age. 134 To be sure, as
noted above, J.D.B. himself was thirteen-years-old when he was
interrogated by the police.
We turn, then, to a look at the case law where J.D.B. has made a
difference.135 As both the J.D.B. majority and Justice Alito properly

133564 U.S. at 277.
134. For most criminal offenses, those under fifteen-years-old are arrested
roughly one-third of the time as reflected in juvenile proceedings. Some crimes (arson,
theft) occur more often with such minors, other crimes (especially alcohol related)
occur
less
often.
See
U.S.
DOJ,
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ crime/qa05104.asp?qaDate=2014.
135. The court decisions are certainly instructive, but it is surprising that there is
little guidance beyond the case law. There are few police department handbooks or
national law enforcement association manuals which even mention the process which
is to take place in deciding the custody question specifically for minors. See Appendix
infra pp. 302-03. Researchers at the College of William & Mary looked at the police
manuals for the 20 largest U.S. cities, not one discussed this matter. Indeed, even the
BNA Law Officer's Pocket Manual, 2016 edition, is silent on the subject. In the section
dealing with Miranda and custody, §6:2 A 1, there is no mention at all of officers
questioning minors. One useful worksheet can be found in International Association
of Police Chiefs, Reducing Risks: An Executive's Guide to Effective Juvenile Interview
and Interrogation,at 27-28 (2006). School districts throughout the U.S. do a better job
of offering guidance with the interrogation of students at school. See, for instance,
these procedures:
* If it is found to be appropriate to question a student and if the
parent/guardian is not present during the questioning, the investigating
officer will inform the student that if requested, the administrator may
remain in the room with the police officer and the student to witness the
questioning. If the parent/guardian is present and requests to witness the
interview, the administrator shall so advise the law enforcement officer.
Marin Schools, Protocolfor PoliceInterviewing Students on a School Campus,
www.marinschools.org/SafeSchools/ Documents/Pl-Interviewing.PDF.
* Law enforcement officers may wish to interview students regarding their
knowledge of suspected criminal activity and may wish to interrogate
students who are themselves suspected of engaging in criminal activity.
Except when law enforcement officers have a warrant or other court order,
or when an emergency or other exigent circumstances exist, such interviews
and interrogations are discouraged during the students' class time. Oyster
River, North Carolina Cooperative School Board, Student Interviews and
Interrogations, http://www.orcsd.org/UserFiles/Servers/Server_538005/File/
School%20Board/Policies/J/JIHDStudentInterviews-and_Interrogations.p

df.
* The principal or designee should be present throughout the questioning or
interrogation, except in cases where the investigation concerns a student who
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noted, the custody decision should involve a consideration of all the
relevant circumstances of the interrogation. 13 6 Under the majority's
view, the age of the youthful offender is part of this "totality of
circumstances" approach. 137 Other factors are "such things as where
the questioning occurred, how long it lasted, what was said, any
physical restraints placed on the suspect's movement, and whether
the suspect was allowed to leave when the questioning was

is the victim of physical or sexual abuse where a member of the student's

immediate family or household is suspected of being the perpetrator or a
conspirator in such abuse and where the police investigator is a
representative of a special unit trained to do such interviews. Sussex County,
Interrogations,Searches and Seizures, www.irsd.net/common/pages/Display
File.aspx?itemld=645039.
* Whenever possible, law enforcement officials should contact and/or
question students out of school. When it is absolutely necessary for an officer
to make a school contact with a student, the school authorities will bring the
student to a private room and the contact is made out of the sight of others
as much as possible.... Attempts must be made to notify the school principal
before a student may be questioned in school or taken from a classroom....
The administration shall attempt to notify the parent(s) of the student to be
interviewed by the law enforcement officials before questioning begins,
unless extenuating circumstances dictate that this is not to be done. Hilliard
City
School
District,
Interrogations
and
Searches,
https://www.hilliardschools.org/board/policy/JFGRInterrogations~andSe
arches.pdf.
* If the police find it necessary to interrogate a student about possible
criminal conduct or activity, to issue Miranda rights to a student, or the
student is taken into police custody, the school official shall immediately take
all reasonable steps to contact the parent(s)/guardian(s) of the minor student.
The school officials or designee will continue efforts to contact the parent(s)/
guardian(s) until actual contact is made to advise them of the action taken
by the police. Wausau School District, Interviews/Interrogationsof Students
by Law Enforcement Officers During School Hours and at School Buildings,
http://www.wausauschools.org/UserFiles/Servers/Server_808843/File/Distri
ct/5740.pdf.
136. 564 U.S. at 284.
137. Id. One can readily find an enormous number of cases applying the totality
approach in determining if minors and young adults were in custody. See, e.g., In re
Adriana G., 2017 WL 605671, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2017); State v. Jensen, 385
P.3d 5, 12 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016); N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 862 (Ky.
2013); Norwood v. State, 114 A.3d 267, 276 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); Commonwealth
v. Bermudez, 980 N.E.2d 462, 468-69 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); In re R.S., 2014 WL
4071562, at *3 (Ohio Aug. 18, 2014); In re E.W., 114 A.3d 112, 117 (Vt. 2015);
Commonwealth v. Floyd, 2011 WL 4026805, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2011); State
v. A.I., 2017 WL 2229931, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).
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To this, of course, we must now add the age of the
suspect. Let us look at the cases through this lens. 139
through."

138. 564 U.S. at 286, relying on these cases: Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98,
110, 113 (2010) (Edwards v. Arizona's presumption of involuntariness for
communications with law enforcement persists only for 14 days after the right to
counsel is invoked); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434-37 (1984) (declining to
extend Miranda protections to routine traffic stops); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 655-56 (1984) (establishing an exception to Miranda requirements where
questioning by law enforcement is "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety"); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983) (no custody where defendant
voluntarily accompanied officers to police station to answer questions shortly after
offense was committed and suspect was not arrested). United States v. Patterson
provides a good overview of the law governing custody:
In determining whether a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes would
have felt free to leave, we consider "all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation." Factors relevant to the totality of the circumstances analysis
include: (1) the location of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the
interrogation; (3) any statements made by the suspect during the
interrogation; (4) any use of physical restraints during the interrogation; and
(5) whether the suspect was released at the end of the interrogation. We have
provided a non-exhaustive list of example factors, which includes: "whether
the encounter occurred in a public place; whether the suspect consented to
speak with the officers; whether the officers informed the individual that he
was not under arrest and was free to leave; whether the individual was
moved to another area; whether there was a threatening presence of several
officers and a display of weapons or physical force; and whether the officers'
tone of voice was such that their requests were likely to be obeyed."
826 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 2017
WL 2954678, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 6, 2017); United States v. Diaz, 2016 WL 4180981,
at *2-3 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2016).
139. One commentator developed for the general reader a list of even more specific
factors:
* Who asked the questions? Was it a police officer? A prison guard? Was the
questioner in a position of authority? Was he or she carrying a gun? The
identity of the questioner goes to the intimidation level of the interview. For
example, a court may consider an armed police officer or prison guard more
compelling than a postal inspector.
* How many officers were there? More officers points to a more coercive
setting.
* Who else was there? A court may find a situation less coercive if the
suspect is surrounded by friends or family.
* Who initiated the discussion? A suspect walking up to an officer and asking
questions suggests a non-custodial situation.
* Did the officer tell the suspect the interview was voluntary? If so, a court
is more likely to consider the interview non-custodial.
* Where did the questioning take place? Was it at the police station? The
suspect's house? On the street? In a hospital room? The issue is how familiar
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A. Cases Where Age of the Suspect was of High Importance in
Custody Determination
The question is not entirely about the number of years the
individual has attained. As pointed out by Justice Sotomayor, "'[o]ur
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition' that children
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults."140 Still, the age of the
minor is of primary significance. Common sense indicates that the
younger the suspect, the more concerned one should be with the
process. Just as Justice O'Connor in Alvaradol41 was not moved by
the age of the soon-to-be eighteen-year-old offender, courts certainly
ought to be moved by the questioning of juveniles who are well below
the age of eighteen. Precedent dictates that the cut off seems to be
about thirteen-years-old. Below that age, the courts are highly
skeptical; much above that age and the courts are more inclined to
defer to law enforcement. For this category, at least, there is some
consistency. Still, even nine-year-olds (yes, nine-year-olds) can be

or coercive the setting is to the suspect. An interview at a police station, for
example, would likely be more intimidating than one on a sidewalk.
* Did the officer use any force on the suspect? If an officer used force prior to
or during the questioning, a court may consider it a custodial situation.
* Did the officer use any physical restraints? Was the suspect able to move
around? Restriction of movement supports a finding of custody.
* What time was it when the conversation took place? Was it the middle of
the night? Or during the day? An interview at an odd hour may point to
custody.
* How long did the questioning last? Longer interviews lean toward a
finding of custody.
* What was the style of the interview? Were the questions accusatory or
routine? An interviewer accusing the suspect of certain acts in a threatening
manner may indicate a custodial situation.
* Was the suspect free to leave at the end of the conversation? A "yes" answer
tends to suggest that the suspect wasn't in custody.
Jane Rydholm, Miranda: The Meaning of "Custodial Interrogation", NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedialmiranda-the-meaning-custodialinterrogation.html; see also LaToya Powell, Applying the Reasonable Child Standard
to Juvenile InterrogationsAfter J.D.B. v. North Carolina, JUv. L. BULL., at 8 (Feb.
2016) (discussing the application of J.D.B. factors in interrogations); Allison Redlich,
et al, The Police Interrogations of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATION,
CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT 107 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (examining the
factors as applied in interrogations); see also Appendix, infra pp. 302-03.
140. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274. Or, as one court recently put it: "[Tihe mind of a
fourteen-year-old is markedly less developed than that of an adult." Weeden v.
Johnson, 854 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017).
141. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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found to be not in custody, while cases with seventeen-year-olds may
reach different results. 142
There are many illustrations of the basic point. In a recent case, a
twelve-year-old was accused of sexually abusing her younger friend.143
She was questioned at the police station, was not given warnings, and
made an incriminating statement.1 44 The court found that the minor
was in custody, though the government argued to the contrary relying
on the fact that she had not been arrested until after the incriminating
statement was made.1 45 The court considered a number of factors in
finding custody, including that K.C. was twelve-years-old at the time
of the interview with the police, she had no previous experience with
the criminal justice system, she was brought by her mother at the
detectives' request, which limited her control over events and
rendered her presence involuntary.1 46 The court also recognized that
though the room where the detectives conducted the interview was

142. A nine-year-old was the subject of D.L.H., Jr., 32 N.E. 3d 1075 (Ill. 2015).
There the court wrote:
[The court must make an objective determination as to whether a reasonable
person, innocent of wrongdoing, would have believed he or she was free to
terminate the questioning and leave. Where, as here, the person questioned
is a juvenile, the reasonable person standard is modified to take that fact into
account. . . . After thoroughly reviewing the video recordings of the two
interviews of respondent, as well as Detective Adams's testimony at the
suppression hearing, we conclude respondent was not in custody when he
was questioned. Both interviews took place in surroundings familiar to
respondent-his home, at his kitchen table. Detective Adams was the only
officer present. He wore his service revolver, but was not in uniform....
Detective Adams was aware that respondent was just nine years old. Indeed,
he testified that he had concerns about questioning someone so young. The
State concedes that this factor favors a finding that respondent was in
custody. It is, however, only one factor of many....
Id. at 1088. The child was found to be not in custody. Two justices disagreed with the
court's reasoning.
Certainly the most compelling factor here is respondent's tender age.
Although I question whether any child-particularly a child under the age of
13-ever truly feels that he or she has the freedom to not cooperate with
police, it is clear to me that a nine-year-old such as respondent here, who had
no prior experience with law enforcement, would have felt compelled to speak
to Detective Adams.
Id. at 1098 (Burke & Freeman JJ., specially concurring). The issues with older
juveniles are discussed infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.

143.

In re KC., 32 N.E. 3d 988, 990 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).

144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 993.

146.

Id.
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unlocked, it was small, approximately 10'x10' or 12'x12', and
contained only a table and three or four chairs. 147 The detectives
initially told K.C. and her mother that K.C. was not under arrest, and
that she would be going home at the conclusion of the interview. 148
The detectives asked her mother to leave immediately during the
interview, and K.C. was left alone with the two female detectives; the
detectives did not offer to let her talk to her mother during the
interview, which lasted approximately 75 minutes. 149
Even with many factors, it is clear that the youth of the suspect
was pivotal, as reflected in the language of that decision and others:
"This is not to say that we would reach the same result in every case
involving a 12-year-old." 50 In another recent case involving a twelveyear-old, the juvenile was questioned in the office of his middle school
principal by a police officer.15 1 He, too, was not warned of his rights.1 52
The court found that he was in custody and thus the interrogation
violated Miranda.153 Once again, while noting that "[n]o one factor is
dispositive"1 54 , the court focused on the age of the minor.1 55
"Considering all the circumstances of F.F.'s interrogation, we conclude
no reasonable 12-year-old in F.F.'s position would believe he was free
to leave the principal's office or terminate the police officer's
56
interrogation."1

147.
148.
149.

150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

151.
152.

In re F.F., 2013 WL 1274706, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013).

153.

Id.

Id.

154. Id. at *2.
155. Id. at *3 ("A consideration in the objective custody determination, as the
Supreme Court has noted, was F.F.'s youth and detention in the principal's office. A
school principal's office is a more coercive atmosphere for a child attending that school
than for the average adult."); Id. at *6 ("F.F., 12 years old and 4 feet 10 inches tall,
was seated, unhandcuffed, in the principal's office. Sergeant Baarts was aware of his
youth, and testified he estimated F.F. to be under the age of 14.").
156. Id. The court in In re L.G., 2017 WL 2223058, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12,
2017) considered the custody issue with the questioning at school of a thirteen-year-

old:
It was apparent that an active police (as well as school) investigation was
underway-uniformed police officers and bomb-sniffing dogs were present,
and a Crime Stoppers reward had been offered to the students. All students
were gathered in the school's gymnasium following a bomb threat; they were
not free to move about the school on their own. L.G. was retrieved from the
gymnasium by the school resource officer, who had the authority of a special
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Such determinations may make good sense when the suspect is a
very young child. Few courts, though, reach the same conclusion
under relatively similar circumstances when the individual is older.
For example, in Gaono v. Long the suspect was seventeen-years-old.15 7
The interrogation process there was intense.158 It took place at the
police station, the defendant had been handcuffed, and the
questioning was for a few hours around midnight. 59 Still, a state
court finding of no custody was upheld, 160 citing the fact that the
suspect was "nearing the age of majority."161 Another California
decision was even less concerned with the age of the suspect.1 62 In
investigating an attempted murder, the police questioned the
defendant at his home. 163 The officer testified that he went to the
defendant's house, and asked the suspect to come out to the porch; the
officer stated "that he would not have allowed defendant to go back

police officer. L.G. was brought to the cafeteria to be questioned by the school
district's Executive Director of Safety and Security, not school personnel with
whom L.G. would have been familiar. Two uniformed officers stood five to
fifteen feet from L.G., standing closer to L.G. than to [Executive Director];
Officer Stewart indicated that he observed [Executive Director's] questioning
of L.G. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in L.G.'s position
would have believed that he was in custody.
In re L.G., 2017 WL 2223058, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2017); see also In re
Edgar, 2014 WL 3752828 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2014) ("Edgar was only 13 years old
at the time of his police interview. At no point did Officer Horvat or the assistant
principal give Edgar an opportunity to call his mother, tell him he was free to leave,
or inform him that he was not obligated to speak to her. In our view, a reasonable 13
year old in Edgar's position would not have felt free to leave the assistant principal's
office where the officer asked the door be closed and both the assistant principal and
officer were present. A child in Edgar's situation would reasonably believe that his
disobedience would subject him to disciplinary action."); United States v. IMM, 747
F.3d 754, 767 (9th Cir. 2014) ("the detective's aggressive, coercive, and deceptive
interrogation tactics created an atmosphere in which no reasonable twelve year old
would have felt free to tell the detective, an adult making full use of his position of
authority, to stop questioning him."). But see B.A. v. State, 2017 WL 1162205 (Ind. Ct.
App. Jun. 1, 2017) (where the thirteen-year-old was found not to be in custody; there
the questioning was conducted by a school official, not a police officer).
157. 2014 WL 171548 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014).

158.
159.

Id. at *17.
Id.

160. A later interview of the suspect was found to be custodial, as at that point he
"asked [the officer] if he could leave, she stated that she did not know what was going
on, that he would have to leave with his mother because of his age, and that he should
put his head down and rest." Id.
161. Id. at *18.
162. People v. Gonzales-Loredo, 2013 WL 754057, at *1 (Cal. App. Feb. 28, 2013).

163.

Id.
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inside his house and shut the door." 164 The court did not find custody;
the discussion of the custody issue was minimal, with the appeals
court simply noting, "It]he defendant was close to his 17th
birthday." 165
B. Focusing on Location in Making Custody Determination
Most relevant litigation involves questioning taking place either
in or near the suspect's home or at the individual's school. In many of
these cases courts weigh the presence of an adult at that location as
part of the determination. This is true whether the adult is viewed as
part of the law enforcement team, or as someone who is supportive of
the minor, such as a parent, relative, or friend. Still other courts write
about the friendly (or unfriendly) environment in which the
questioning takes place. Looking at these factors, however, has led
courts to issue rulings on custody which appear to be utterly
irreconcilable. 166

In one recent Ohio case, no custody was found where the very
young child-nine-years-old-was questioned near his home with his
mother "in the immediate vicinity."16 7 There was no custody where the
child, after the questioning, "was not placed under arrest and was
allowed to go home with his parents."16 8 A similar ruling, with another
nine-year-old child, focused on the questioning occurring at home with
the father of the child being present.1 69 A judge in the case, specially
concurring, saw things quite differently.
[S]ince respondent was in his own home, where could he have
gone if he wanted to leave?

. . .In addition, the fact that

respondent's father was present, in my view, only served to
place the parent's imprimatur on the questioning. The father

164.

Id.

165. Id. at *2. As stated in Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 980 N.E. 2d 462, 468
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012): "The defendant's age, a few months shy of his eighteenth
birthday, placed him on the cusp of majority, and far removed from the tender years
of early adolescence."; see also In re C.O., 84 A.3d 726, 734 (Pa. Super Ct. 2014).
Compare N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W. 3d 852, 862 (Ky. 2013) (seventeen-year-old;
custody found), with State v. Jones, 55 A3d 432, 440 (Me. 2012) (seventeen-year-old;
no custody). See generally State v. Pearson, 804 N.W.2d 26, 269 (Iowa 2011) (court
emphasized that the defendant was "a hardened seventeen-year-old").
166. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
167. In re R.L., 23 N.E. 3d 298, 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
168. Id. The court did not mention J.D.B.

169.

D.L.H., Jr., 32 N.E. 3d at 1082.
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played virtually no role in counseling or advising his son. The
only time respondent's father advised him was to tell him to
"tell the truth," which reinforced the notion that respondent
was required to speak to the police. 7 0
The court in a 2015 case from California had an even easier time
deciding that an older suspect was not in custody. 171 The juvenile was
seventeen-years-old, he was questioned just outside his home and his
mother was there.1 72 The court made clear that the officer "spoke
politely. . . [and there was] no evidence the officer was coercive or
attempted to pressure Minor, and he did not restrict Minor's freedom
of movement." 173
Other courts, however, reached quite different results looking to
very much the same elements. Coming back to Ohio we find another
recent case in which the fourteen-year-old was brought to Children
Services by his mother.1 74 The court recognized that the interview had
not occurred at the police department and the minor was told he was
not under arrest.175 Still, custody was found, as "a reasonable juvenile
in T.W.'s position would likely not feel free to stand, walk past the
authoritarian figure seated near the door and out of the interview
room." 7 6 A Louisiana court also decided the minor, a fifteen-year-old,
was in custody when he was interviewed at school. 7 7 This was so even
though his mother had brought him to the school,17 8 a very familiar
environment. The majority explained:
[H]is presence [at the school] was ostensibly involuntary....
Bearing this in mind, at fifteen years of age, a reasonable
juvenile in J.D.'s position would, in all likelihood, be
intimidated and overwhelmed. Thus, the evidence tends to

170.
Adriana,
2754107,
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 1098 (Burke & Freeman, JJ., specially concurring). See also In re
2017 WL 605671, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2017); In re T.J., 2016 WL
at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2016).
In re Cristofer, 2015 WL 5919114 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2015).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
In re T.W., 2012 WL 1925656, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 2012).
Id. at *5.
Id.
State in the Interest of J.D., 154 So. 3d 726, 733 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 728-29.
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suggest that a reasonable fifteen-year-old would believe that
his freedom of movement had been significantly restricted.179
If these holdings stand under J.D.B., how then to explain the
80
result in In re R.S.?o
There, the court determined the sixteen-yearold was not in custody even though he was brought to the office of the
juvenile probation officer and was questioned by a uniformed police
officer.18 1 And, while the officer said that the minor and his father
were free to leave the office at any time, the officer did not tell this to
the minor or his father.1 82 The court concluded that "a reasonable 16year-old in R.S.'s position would have felt free to terminate the
interview and leave the premises."18 3
With these cases, it is extremely difficult to see any uniform
pattern of location and presence of others beyond a recitation of the
factors to be considered. To illustrate the point, one must ask where
this statement by a court in Alaskal 84 fits with these other decisions:
[C]ourts "are virtually unanimous in recognizing that a
directive or 'request' for a secondary school student to leave
class for the purpose of being questioned by a police officer can
result
in
a
custodial
interrogation
for
Miranda
purposes.". . [A] student who is told by a principal or teacher
that he must speak with a law enforcement officer might
reasonably believe that he is not free to leave the interview or
break off questioning. Furthermore, a police interview is not
something that a reasonable student would anticipate as part

179. Id. at 732-33. But see Cobb v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 5525355, at *8
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (seventeen-year-old brought to school offices, but he was not a suspect
"and was free to leave at any time.").
180. In re R.S., 2014 WL 4071562, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
181. Id. at *1, *4-.
182. Id. at *5.
183. Id. at *6; see also In re J.T.M., 884 N.W. 2d 535 2016 WL 3884577, at *1 (Wis.
Ct. App. Jul. 19, 2016) (questioning at private residential facility for children with
special needs; suspect was sixteen-years-old). There are numerous cases where the
presence of a family member in the interview setting is deemed highly relevant. See.
e.g., In re Hector S., 2016 WL 3685091, at *8-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jul. 12, 2016)
(sister); In re T.J., 2016 WL 2754107, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2016) (father). But
see State v. Betancourth, 2016 WL 7222859, at *16 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2016)
(suspect's parents were barred from the interview room, but the court did not find
custody because "[n]o officer told Betancourth that he was under arrest .. [He] left
when he wanted.").
184. Kalmakoff v. State, 257 P.3d 108, 112 (Alaska 2011) (fifteen-year-old
defendant was taken out of school for an interview in a city office).
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of a normal school day and is simply not comparable to routine
activities such as taking a standardized test or speaking with
a counselor about class choices. Thus, the fact that a student
was directed by school authorities to leave class to speak with
law enforcement officers is a relevant fact "pertaining to
events before the interrogation" that may, depending on the
individual circumstances, support a finding of Miranda
custody.185
C. Evaluatingthe Durationof the Interrogationin Making Custody
Determination
Somewhat surprisingly, the duration of the interrogation is not
often a major issue in reported cases dealing with custody issues for
minors. One might think that the number of hours of questioning
would be significant, especially when a juvenile suspect is involved.
Still, there are relatively few reported cases in which the interrogation
of a minor lasted an extended period. Perhaps law enforcement
officers are heeding the advice given in the major police set of
guidelines published by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, mentioned above. 186 The prevailing advice is to keep it
minimal:
Juveniles can tolerate only about an hour of questioning before
a substantial break should occur. A juvenile interrogation
should never last longer than four hours. In fact, if a child or
adolescent is questioned for a prolonged period of time, the
risk that any statement will be either involuntary or
unreliable increases substantially with each passing hour. 8 7
Of course, if the questioning lasts for only minutes, that timing
will help establish that no custody was present. 188 If the interrogation

185. Id. at 121, 123 (citations omitted).
186. See The International Association of Chiefs of Police, supra note 135.
187. Id. at 8.
188. See, e.g., People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, 292 (Colo. 2014) ("[t]he entire
interview was over within 5-10 minutes."). Still, there is not complete agreement.
Another judge, concurring in judgment in N.AS., focused on factors apart from the
time involved:
Here, the encounter occurred at school in a small, closed room; a uniformed
police officer and the two school officials were present; the officer and the
principal stood during the interrogation; N.A.S. did not have an opportunity
to speak to a parent or legal guardian alone (although his father and uncle
were also in the room); the officer did not tell N.A.S. that he was free to leave;
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lasts for a longer, but not extended, period, then duration becomes a
consideration-albeit a relatively minor one.189

D. EvaluatingStatements Made by Police and Whether Suspect was
Told She was Free to Leave
For some courts, this factor is the most important in the analysis.
In essence, courts are asking if the minor truly understood from the
officers' words that she was not being detained. In some cases, the
courts make clear that the tone and mood of the conversation will be
determinative on the matter of custody. For instance, in one Illinois
case involving a fifteen-year-old, 19 0 the court was moved by some key
facts surrounding the questioning: "the record does not show the
officer badgered respondent"19 1 "the officer's use of a hypothetical
shows the questioning was inquisitory ('[What would have happened
if you and T.H. got into a fight?') rather than accusatory ('You were
going to stab T.H., weren't you?'),"1 9 2 "nothing indicates [the officer]
engaged in any physical or mental abuse or made threats or promises
to respondent in an attempt to coerce or intimidate her into making
an inculpatory statement." 193
Contrast the tone in that opinion with that found in In re of
S.R.,19 4 where the officer took a very different posture in the
interrogation process:
The detective and S.R. initially made small talk. Then the
detective told S.R. about the alleged victim's accusations and
said that the alleged victim was not lying. The detective
continually encouraged S.R. to be honest, at one point telling

the officer warned N.A.S. that the charges were very serious and could affect
the rest of his life; the officer's tone and demeanor were serious; and the mood
was somber and intimidating, especially for a 13-year-old child.
Id. at 294 (Hood, J., concurring in judgment); see also In re T.D.B., 2017 WL 1208755,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. April 3, 2017) (five to seven minute interrogation ofa seventeenyear-old); In re T.J., 2016 WL 2754107, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2016) (interview of
the thirteen-year-old lasted twenty to thirty minutes).
189. As it was in People v. Sample, 2013 WL 5460190, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1,
2013), discussed infra, where the questioning of the high school student lasted two
hours. Id. at *10. Of most importance to the court was that the suspect was told that
he was not under arrest. See infra note 197.
190. In re Marquita, 970 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
191. Id. at 604.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 605.
194. 2017 WL 1300092, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2017).
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him that people are usually more lenient or more forgiving
towards those who are honest. The detective told S.R. that
everyone makes mistakes and nothing he said would prevent
him from leaving on his own. 195
The court found custody even though the officer had earlier told the
suspect that he was not under arrest and that he could end the
questioning and leave if he wished. 19s Though noting that the
decision on custody was "a close call," the court found a Miranda
violation:

[The facts surrounding the interrogation highlight the
differences between how an adult may have viewed the
situation versus a child. S.R.'s interrogation occurred around
8 a.m. at the Gardner police station. The district court did not
find the time of the interrogation to be coercive. However, the
interrogation did take place at a police station rather than at
a neutral location, which generally points to the interrogation
being custodial. The interrogation lasted about 1 hour and 40
minutes, which also adds to the custodial nature of the
interrogation, although there have been instances where
longer interrogations have been held to be noncustodial.
... While an adult may have felt free to leave in this instance,
the entire record suggests that S.R.-an immature child of 13
who was unfamiliar with the criminal justice system-did not
feel free to leave. 197

195.
196.

Id. at*1.
Id.

197. Id. at *3-4; see also United States v. IMM, 747 F.3d 754, 766-67 (9th Cir.
2014) (discussing the interrogation of a twelve-year-old). But cf. Sample, 2013 WL
5460190, at *11-12:
We think a reasonable person in Sample's position would have felt free, under
these circumstances, to end the questioning and leave. Sample was told twice
that he was not under arrest, and he was also assured that police did not
intend to arrest him that day. The door to the interview room was not locked.
Although Sample was asked at the start of the interview to "do [Pritchard] a
favor" and turn off his cell phone, it was not taken from him, and there were
at least two breaks when Sample was left alone and could have called anyone
he wanted to call.
Id. (sixteen-year-old suspect).
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Of course, if the officer directly advises the juvenile that he is not
under arrest and may leave, generally, that greatly helps the claim
that the suspect was not in custody during the interrogation. For
instance, in one recent case, 198 the fifteen-year-old suspect was
"clearly told [the officer] was only there to talk to him, he was not
under arrest, he did not have to talk and was free to leave." 199 An
Alaska court acknowledged that "a fifteen-year-old is significantly
more likely than an adult to be intimidated by the type of
confrontational questioning that took place in this case." 2 0 0 The court
nevertheless decided that the minor was not in custody, as he "was
told that he did not have to submit to the interview, and he was given
the chance to consult with, or obtain the presence of, a parent or
guardian." 201
Nevertheless, even telling the suspect she is not under arrest may
be insufficient to dispel the notion of custody. The matter can remain
difficult, as in one recent case where the petitioner, sixteen-years-old,
was suspected of killing his eighteen-month-old daughter. 202 While at
school he was brought to the administrative office to be interviewed
by a police officer. 203 He was immediately told that he was not under
arrest. 204 A second time-while he was being questioned at the police
station-he was told he was not under arrest and further that "the
door is open; you're free to leave at any time." 2 0 5 Soon thereafter he
was told yet again that he was not under arrest. 2 06 Still, the United

States Magistrate Judge found that the suspect was in custody
because of the time elapsed between the advisements and the
incriminating statement, along with other comments made by the
investigating officers which "actually conveyed the opposite indication

198. In re M.B., 2016 WL 3570621, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2016).
199. Id. at *7; see also In re Adriana, 2017 WL 605671, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
15, 2017) (where police told the fifteen-year-old suspect that she was not under arrest).

200. W.L. v. State, 2015 WL1757343, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2015).
201. Id.; see also In re C.B., 2016 WL 3570600, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2016)
("At the outset, C.B. was told by [the officer] he was there to talk to him, he was not
under arrest, he did not have to talk to him, and he was free to leave."); In re C.M.A.,
2013 WL 3481517, at *4 (Tx. App. Jul. 2, 2013) ("C.M.A. was expressly told that he
was not under arrest. During the first interview, there was likewise evidence that
C.M.A. was also told that he did not need to speak with Beathard and was free to leave
the room at any time.").
202. Smith v. Clark, 612 F. App'x 418, 421 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
203. Smith v. Clark, 2013 WL 4409717, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).
204. Id.
205. Id. at *12.
206. Id. at *13.
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that a reasonable person would feel free to leave." 2 0 7 The Ninth
Circuit, on appeal, took a very different view. Applying the deferential
standard mandated in a habeas corpus proceeding, 208 the court found
that the state court's conclusion of no custody was not
unreasonable. 209 The court stressed the words spoken to the minor:
Most significantly, as the state appellate court emphasized,
the police advised Smith that he was not under arrest three
times and that he was free to leave twice. The Supreme Court
and this Court have consistently recognized that such
advisements weigh strongly in favor of the view that an
interviewee was not in custody. 2 10
The concurring judge was much less convinced.
The police subjected the petitioner in this case, Jovon'z Smith,
to incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated
atmosphere-namely, a small, windowless room in the bowels
of the police station, without his parents or any other family
members present. Interrogating a suspect in that setting, the
Court recognized in Miranda, gives the police a significant
psychological advantage in overcoming a suspect's desire to
remain silent. Why? Mainly because the suspect is alone, cut
off from the rest of the world, in surroundings that are
intimidating and unfamiliar.
In giving all-but-dispositive weight to a "you're not under
arrest" advisement, the California courts appear to be
validating a practice adopted by at least some California police
departments. Those departments interpret existing Supreme
Court precedent to mean that so long as a suspect is told he's

207. Id.
208. The court stated that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA):
authorizes the grant of a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
when the relevant state court decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
612 F. App'x at 418 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)).
209. Id. at 419-20.
210. Id. at 420; see also Booker v. Commonwealth, 2017 WL 1102987, at *5 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017) (fifteen-year-old told he was not suspect).
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not under arrest, officers need not provide Mirandawarnings,
even if the circumstances surrounding the interrogation give
rise to the same "inherently compelling pressures" to speak
that the warnings were designed to combat. 2 11
The complications here were also explored by two state judges in
a recent Vermont case. 212 For the majority, the determinative fact was
that the juvenile was not told he was free to leave:
There is no dispute that the officer here did not explain to E.W.
or his foster parent that they were free to end the interview
and leave. Although not dispositive, we have held that a clear
communication from the police to the person being questioned
about his or her freedom is "the most important factor" in
determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free
to terminate the interview and leave at any time. When the
police are questioning a minor, the relative inexperience and
vulnerability to authority of the youthful suspect renders this
factor even more critical. 213
The dissenting justice looked to other significant facts which led him
to believe there was no custody, even though the suspect had not been
told he was not under arrest:
Common sense demonstrates that a fifteen-year-old juvenile is
more responsible than a younger child and able to understand
whether a situation has created a "restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
Vermont law recognizes this fact, treating juveniles differently
depending upon the nature of the alleged crime and the age of
the juvenile. . . . Here, given the other circumstances-that
E.W. was questioned by one police officer in a familiar setting
and with family members close by-there is nothing to
indicate that a reasonable fifteen-year-old in E.W.'s
circumstances would perceive that he was under arrest and
not free to leave. 214

211.
212.
213.
214.
Jensen,
year-old

612 F. App'x. at 422, 424. (Watford, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
In re E.W., 114 A.3d 112 (Vt. 2015).
Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
Id. at 123-24 (Dooley, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also State v.
385 P.3d 5, 12 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (finding no custody when the seventeensuspect "was never told he was not free to leave").
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E. Evaluating Whether Suspect had Freedom of Movement when
Making Custody Determination
Often the concerns with limitation of movement are fused into
other categories, such as the location of the interrogation and the
words spoken to the suspects. Still, it is important to point out the
significance courts place on any apparent restraints on the movement
of the individual. If it is made quite clear to that person, through
actions or words, that she can leave when she wishes to, courts simply
will not find custody. That was the situation in one California case
involving a seventeen-year-old. 215 While the defendant was
questioned at the police station, the court found that this was not
custodial interrogation. 2 16 The defendant "was not physically
restrained at any time. He was placed in an interview room and told
he was not in custody or under arrest, could leave at any time, and
that the door was closed only for privacy reasons." 2 17 In short, there
was no showing that the defendant "was actually or constructively
restrained." 218 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the
same result even though the sixteen-year-old defendant there was
transported by the police from a city street back to his home. 219
Specifically, the court reasoned that
A.J. was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, nor did
Officer Parsons accuse him of a crime. Indeed, beyond the bare
fact of temporary seizure to transport A.J. to his home nearby
for purposes of investigation, there is nothing that the officer
did that could plausibly be perceived, from A.J.'s perspective
or any other, as coercive, or as though he was being
arrested. 220
Yet here, as elsewhere, it is difficult to find consistency in the
application of the custody doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court.
Another California case makes the point nicely. 22 1 There, the thirteenyear-old boy's father was actively involved in the entire interrogation

215. People v. Rocha, 2013 WL 4774758, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2013).
216. Id. at *6-8.
217. Id. at *7.
218. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 980 N.E. 2d 462, 468 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2012) (discussing factors weighing against finding custodial interrogation).
219. In re A.J., 63 A.3d 562, 568-69 (D.C. 2013).
220. Id.
221. In re J.R., 2015 WL 1577270, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015).
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process: he initiated contact with the police and he consented to the
police questioning of his son. 2 2 2 Yet, the interrogation in the suspect's
home was deemed custodial based on the following facts:
Three officers in uniforms, bullet-proof vests, utility belts, and
guns arrived at the apartment where J.R. lived with his father.
They were just moving in and the apartment was unfurnished.
[The officer] repeatedly told J.R. to stop coming outside and to
remain inside the apartment.

. .

. Essentially, J.R. was kept

inside the apartment, away from his father, by [the
officers].[The minor] was later taken into an unfurnished
bedroom with two of the officers for questioning (although one
officer later agreed to leave). The officers closed the bedroom
door during the questioning.... The purpose of the interview
was not to question J.R. as a witness, but as a suspect. The
police never told J.R. that he was free to terminate the
interview, leave the apartment, or have his father present for
the questioning....
Although the questioning occurred where J.R. lived, the
apartment was hardly a comfortable and secure home-like
environment; it was not yet furnished and the only seating was
in the bathroom. Finally, J.R. was a 13-year-old boy, and no
evidence suggested he had any experience with the criminal
justice system, such that he would understand he was free to
end the questioning and leave. 2 2 3
CONCLUSION

It is of great importance that courts apply the Mirandaruling to
juveniles in custody decisions. 224 Certainly, courts follow the J.D.B.
mandate and factor in the age of the minor being interrogated. But
the way in which age is factored in is wholly another matter. There
simply is no uniformity in the reported cases. This is true whether one
222.
223.
224.

Id. at *6.
Id.
Each year, almost one million juveniles are arrested. See U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL

BRIEFING BOOK, version 2015, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/qa05lOl.asp?qa
(https://www.ojjdp.gov/gojstatbb/crime/qa05lOl.asp?q)-[https://perma.cc/T5R32ULX_(https://perma.cc/T5R32ULX) (last visited Nov. 28, 2017). Former President
Obama discussed this in his recent article. See Barack Obama, The President'sRole in
Advancing CriminalJustice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 852 (2017).
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looks only to the age of the suspect or to other elements such as the
location and duration of the interrogation. Though such lack of
consistency is disappointing, it is not surprising. After all, men and
women, mostly in their fifties and sixties, are being asked to consider
how a reasonable teen or younger child would think about the
deprivation of liberty in a given situation. 225
It is a task that may be beyond virtually all adults. One
thoughtful commentator recently stated the matter clearly:
Finally,
adolescents' decision-making
processes differ
significantly than adults'. Generally, and not surprisingly,
studies of adolescence reveal that teens as a class are less
competent decision-makers than adults. Even as teens'
cognitive capacities approach that of adults in midadolescence, they are less skilled than their adult counterparts
in using these capacities to make real-life decisions.
[The law's] reliance on inference is fundamentally flawed as it
fails to account for the distinctive thought processes of
adolescent actors. Recent developments in neuroscience
confirm this difference. The impulsive, risk taking, reward
centered, consequence blind existence that is adolescence is
both a shared right of passage and a lost moment for adult fact
finders. While a juror or judge may remember youth, he will
not remember the decision-making processes that drove his
daily adolescent existence. Therefore as criminal law asks him
to sit in judgment of juvenile defendants, it asks him to
perform the impossible task of placing himself back in time
into the mind of an adolescent. 226

225. The average and median age of currently-serving U.S. judges is about sixtyyears-old while the average and median age at the time of appointment is about 50years-old. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 11 (2017), available
at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mise/R43426.pdf. The question then becomes: How do
such advanced in age adults decide "whether, based upon the objective circumstances,
a reasonable child of the same age [as the suspect] would believe his freedom of
movement was significantly restricted"? C.MA., 2013 WL 3481517, at *4 (quoting In
re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 289 (Tex. App. 1999)).
226. Jenny E. Carroll, The Problem with Inference and Juvenile Defendants, 45
FLA. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).

2017]

MIRANDA CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

299

While there has been considerable social science research on what
young people believe, and how they process information, 227 the
judicial decisions hardly mention such scholarship. Until courts look
to the actual evidence of understanding by minors in this setting, the
best solution one can hope for is to add to the constitutional mandate.
That is, more legislatures should be encouraged to adopt the specific
and somewhat strict limits some states have put in statutory language
on how, when and where minors can be interrogated by law
enforcement officers. 228 While hardly dispute free, these laws offer the
kind of guidance simply not present with Miranda and J.D.B. as
applied. If the Justices will not act to fully support this view, it is up
to legislators to do so.

227. See supra notes 131-32.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34. The New Mexico Supreme Court
in State v. Rivas, 398 P. 3d 299 (N.M. 2017) discussed the varied legislative
approaches:
Recognizing these principles, numerous other jurisdictions have established,
by statutory scheme, special protections for children subject to police
questioning, both before and after attachment of the Sixth Amendment right.
Some require that a parent or guardian be present at questioning, or before
a child may validly waive the right to counsel. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-137(a) (West 2012) (statements of a child under sixteen inadmissible
unless made in the presence of a parent or guardian who has been advised of
the child's rights); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-303(3) (West 1980) (police must
extend invitation to parent or guardian to be present for child's
interrogation). Others require the presence of parent or counsel. See, e.g., Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-32-5-1(3) (West 1997); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 27-20-26(1)
(West 2012); cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-511(1) (West 1999). Still others
direct that waiver can be made only with the assistance of counsel. Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 51.09(1) (West 1997); W. Va. Code Ann. § 49-4-701(1) (West

2016).
Id. at 311.

[Vol. 85.251

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

300

APPENDIX

oo

tTar.0rns INUns

Mc

taxess
KOwr&

,S

P

Tfh4A0*r

4)0:s.. c
4tiA

2thEs-S

hrbt

:farP4a
te
Wajrn-rwxtente

50

L

ornavawrccootxAd

V
______ks

ktjtr w4

Vt

'1

trie

s
_

tl

__

.__

I

2017]

MIRANDA CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

et Yva N

P

A flbes

e5

tep

5&-

tNwt-zVa

Was

YeN,_

Att

Ye

b

b 6

lAs rimnwCastdt Y30.S..
WY ESAMMSTElt Aft4Ntz4 WARNE¶GSl

*

THER

JIVERLL

Ap

* U.Xher

44 L, 0r1so

301

